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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITY LEASING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FLINCO, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant, Respondent and 
Third Party Complainant, 
vs. 
OFFICE EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATES, 
a corporation, and JOHN B. JOHNSON 
Third Party Defendants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 




Plaintiff seeks to require defendant to pay rental 
on equipment after defendant had cancelled the lease 
on the equipment for lack of performance and 
plaintiff's failure to get it programmed to do the 
defendant's work. 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
District Court entered judgment of no cause of 
action on plaintiff's complaint and no cause of action 
1 
on defendant's cross-complaint and counterclaim , 
against plaintiff and third party defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and seeks a 
determination that it is entitled to the balance of 
its lease payments. Neither third party defendant ' 
nor defendant appeals. Defendant seeks an affirm. 
ance of the trial court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant cannot agree to the Statement of Facts 
as set forth in the brief of the plaintiff. 
This case was tried by Honorable Frank Wilkins, 
evidence was taken, a full and complete trial had, 
argument before the cou1·t made, and the judgment 
is based on the evidence received by the court. 
Plaintiff's claim against defendant is based on a 
series of documents that are exhibits. The documents 
are Exhibit P-1 entitled Master Lease Agreement, 
Lease of Personal Property, dated April 26, 1965; 
Master Lease Agreement, Schedule A, Exhibit P-2, 
dated July 29, 1965; Master Lease 
Schedule A, Exhibit P-3, dated March 22, 1966; 
Lessee's Statement and Completion Certificate, Ex-
hibit P-4, dated August 2, 1965. 
The documents covered two items of equipment. 
One item is a CTS-8 Friden Computyper, S5165865, 
2 
and the second item of equipment is a Tab Card 
Punch Control Unit, TCPC 30-873. The Computyper 
was a used item of equipment which Security Leas-
ing Company owned prior to the 26th of April, 1965. 
This is the item of equipment that Exhibit P-1 and P-2 
relate to. 
John B. Johnson, third party defendant, delivered 
the equipment described in the exhibit and presented 
the documents that relate to the Computyper to the 
defendant for its signature. He signed both of the 
documents. In Exhibit P-1 he signed as manu-
facturer's representative witness, and in Exhibit P-2 
he signed simply as witness. No one else signed for 
plaintiff. 
On Exhibit P-4, which relates to the installation of 
the Computyper, Johnson again signed as witness and 
indicated on the Completion Certificate that Office 
Equipment Associates, the other third party defend-
ant, was the vendor of the Computyper. 
The three documents relating to the Computyper 
are forms which plaintiff, Security Leasing Company, 
uses and were furnished by said company. The forms 
do not accurately describe the transaction that was 
entered into between plaintiff and Flinco. It was 
defendant's position throughout the trial that these 
documents do not constitute an integration, having 




The following discrepancies are undisputed: 
C 1) Exhibit P-1, Paragraph 10, recites: 
"Lesse_e J:as selected the prol?erty to be leased 
and it is ordered by Secunty Leasing Com. 
pany for this lessee and at lessee's entire dis-
cretion and risk. Lessor will not be resp0115_ 
ible for any repairs, worn out and/ or replace. 
ment parts or defects in the equipment." 
The undisputed fact is, (a) Security Leasing was the 
owner of the equipment prior to its installation at 
Flin co' s place of business, ( b) it agreed to maintain 
the equipment for one year, ( c) it agreed to program 
the equipment, ( d) Flin co never saw the equipment 
until delivery by Johnson, and ( e) the equipment was 
never ordered by Security Leasing for Flinco. 
Exhibit D-7 shows the agreement by Security 
Leasing and payment to Office Equipment Associates 
of $1,975.00 for the maintenance, programming and 
commission on the lease of its Computyper to Flinco. 
It is undisputed that John B. Johnson undertook 
to do the programming for Security Leasing Com· 
pany, and it is further undisputed that the program-
ming was to be done in stages. John B. Johnson also 
undertook to do the maintenance work on the Com-
putyper for the year shown in Exhibit D-7. It is also 
undisputed that John B. Johnson was not a manu-
facturer's representative, that Office Equipment Asso-
ciates was not the vendor of the equipment, that at 
4 
--
;ill times he was arranging a lease of plaintiff's equip-
n1cnt vYith Flinco, Inc. and was paid for these services, 
including the programming and maintenance by 
Security Leasing Company. 
Programming as used in this case involves the 
\Yiring of the Computyper and adjusting the elec-
tronic panel in the Computyper so that it would pro-
duce the records which Flinco, Inc. needed to conduct 
its business. The Computyper is a machine with the 
ability to produce an invoice, to retain certain infor-
mation off the invoice and give totals at the end of 
a period of time of the mathematical information 
which the machine has retained. It also prints, at the 
time it prints the invoice, a tape. This tape is later 
translated by other electronic equipment which pro-
duces a card for IBM computers. 
Defendant's evidence supports the court's find-
ings that the programming was never completed by 
Johnson and that Johnson was not a trained program-
mer. Programming a Computyper is a very intricate, 
difficult, complex operation CR. 161-167). There 
is no one in the state of Utah who is qualified by the 
Friden Company to program its Computypers CR. 
159 l. 'V"hen Friden itself seeks such services, it must 
import from Denver a trained programmer to wire 
the electronic panel and control so that the machine 
will produce the information that is programmed 
in to it ( R. 15 9 ) . 
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The evidence is undisputed that Johnson had 
worked for Friden prior to his setting up his own ! 
operation as Office Equipment Associates, but had 
never been classified as a programmer. His testimony 
was that on some occasions he has assisted in pro-
gramming. 
The Exhibits P-1, P-2 and P-4, which relate to 
the Computyper, contain no mention of the duty of 
plaintiff to program or maintain the Computyper. 
Exhibit D-7, which shows that such a duty was under-
taken by Security Leasing, is not a part of the docu-
ments which plaintiff claims contain the integrated 
agreement between the parties. 
Flinco was never satisfied with the programming 
which was accomplished (R. 263-266-291). Third 
party defendant undertook to maintain and keep re-
paired the equipment during the year after it was 
installed at Flinco' s place of business. Flinco 
not satisfied with the maintenance either CR. 26+-
265). 
In the spring of 1966 the second piece of equip-
ment was installed at Flinco's place of business. This 
is the Tab Card Punch Control unit represented by 
Exhibit P-3. This item of equipment was actually 
purchased from the Friden Company and then leased 
to Flinco. It is Flinco's evidence on which the court 
relied that the TCPC equipment was required because 
the Computyper would not function efficiently for 
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Flinco. Erroneous data was punched by the Com-
putyper onto the tape. This information was different 
from the information which appeared on the typed 
invoice prepared at the same time CR. 289). These 
erorrs were not discoverable until after the tape had 
been translated by other electronic equipment either 
at Sentinel Security Life Insurance Company's place 
of business or one of the other service bureaus used by 
Flinco. The TCPC unit, it was thought, would pro-
duce the information placed on the tape immedi-
ately and then it could be checked to see whether or 
not that information was the same as the informa-
tion on the invoice. The TCPC was used for about 
six months, but even with it, Flinco could not get 
its work accomplished satisfactorily CR. 287-288-278-
279). 
Defendant's primary complaint about the inade-
quacy of the program which third party defendant 
placed in the machine was that it never did produce 
any totals on which the defendant could rely CR. 257-
260 J. It would not retain the cash sales separate from 
the charge sales and permit the company to know 
what had been sold on credit and what had been sold 
for cash. The cash register never could be balanced 
at the close of the day's business. The machine also 
was never programmed to record on the invoice all 
the information which Flinco needed in the operation 
of its business CR. 263). It was defendant's position 
that the rental of the TCPC unit was only the result 
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of its continuing effort to get the Computyper to pro-
duce the records it needed. The notice of termination ! 
is dated December 2, 1966 (Exhibit P-5). Rent was 
paid in full to the date of termination. 
Plaintiff refused to consent to the termination 
and brought the present action for the balance of the 
payments under the lease. 
Each issue was fully litigated. The court foun<l iu 
favor of the plaintiff on the cross-complaint and 
counterclaims of defendant and in favor of defendant 
on the complaint of plaintiff, entering a judgment on 
each of no cause of action. The evidence presented 
supports the court's findings in every respect. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE WRITTEN 
INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT ALL OF THE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES. 
POINT II 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS NOT 
PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT PAID IN FULL ALL RENT 





SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE WRITTEN 
INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT ALL OF THE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES. 
One of the basic issues presented by the parties 
iu their pleadings and statements to the court was 
vvhether or not there was an integration containing 
all of the agreements between the plaintiff and 
defendant. The court found that there was not an 
integrated written agreement and that part of the 
agreement was in writing, but a substantial amount 
of the understanding between the parties was not in 
writing. 
TI1e agreements signed by both parties were on 
forms which the plaintiff used in routine rental agree-
ments. These forms applied to situations where a 
renter selected the item of personal property and 
Security Leasing would then purchase that property 
and lease it back to the customer. The rental arrange-
ment being one which would provide a method of 
financing the purchase or rental of personal property. 
This vvas not the situation with Flinco. The un-
disputed evidence revealed that Security Leasing 
always owned the Computyper and that Office Equip-
ment Associates and John B. Johnson were actually 
acting as agents for Secw·ity Leasing in placing the 
Computyper with Flinco. Flinco never did select 
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the Computyper and have Security Leasing purchase 
it for them, but actually rented a used item of equip-
ment from Security Leasing. 
The agreements do not describe such a trans-
action. The evidence undisputedly shows the owner-
ship of the equipment and the manner in which it 
was supplied to Flinco. On three material matters, 
the written documents do not describe the true and 
correct understanding. They are, (a) relationship of 
parties, ( b) ownership of the leased equipment 
(c) duty of plaintiff to program and maintain the 
Computyper. 
The written document, (Exhibit D-7), shows that 
Security Leasing was to program the Computyper 
into Flinco's business and maintain it for a year. 
It might be argued that Flinco is responsible for 
the fact that these documents do not accurately 
described the understanding between the parties. If 
Flinco is in some way at fault in this respect, how 
much greater is the responsibility of the plaintiff, 
Security Leasing, since the forms furnished and the 
agreements that were prepared were its forms and 
prepared by its agents and employees. If the princi-
ple to apply is that construction should resolve doubt 
against preparer of instruments, Security must 
suffer. 
It seems clear that it is a factual question as to 
whether or not the understanding between the parties 
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is contained in the written document or is partially 
oral. On this question the undisputed evidence sup-
ports the court's finding that there was no integra-
tion. The agreement between the parties was partly 
in writing and partly oral. (See Findings of Fact, 
No. 2, Page 5 7). 
The general rule seems to be that: 
"Where suit is brought to compel a defendant 
specifically to perform a written contract, 
parol evidence may be given by him to show 
that the alleged agreement is not the true 
agreement." CJ ones on Evidence (5 Ed), Vol. 
2, Sec. 469, P. 897.) 
The law relating to parol evidence has been re-
cently examined in this court in Rainford vs. Rytting, 
........ Utah 2d ........ , 451 P2d 769. The guarantors of 
a purchase contract sought to avoid its provisions by 
showing conditions or oral agreements which were 
at odds with the terms of the written contract. Such 
evidence was inadmissible. This court also has re-
cently decided Jones vs. Acme Building Products, 
Inc., 22 Utah 2d 202, 450 P2d 743, in which it per-
mitted parol evidence from one of the parties to ex-
plain what was intended by the words "net worth" in 
a written instrument since such words are susceptible 
to more than one meaning. It is an exception to parol 
evidence that where there is a latent ambiguity in the 
language of a written instrument, parol evidence may 
be received to explain what the parties had in mind. 
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In the present case the written instruments do not 
refer to the programming of the Computyper. This 
necessary and essential part of the installation of the 
Computyper is nowhere mentioned. Exhibit P-1, the 
lease, is entirely silent. Plaintiff accepted the respons-
ibility for programming the Computyper (See Ex-
hibit D-7). It paid Office Equipment Associates to 
program and maintain the Computyper. 
As far as the progran1ming of the Computyper is 
concerned, the written documents were incomplete. 
This creates a latent ambiguity. The written docu-
ments are not integrated and are actually incomplete. 
Paro! evidence would have to be received then to dis-
cover what the agreement relating to the program-
ming of the Computyper was. This kind of latent 
ambiguity and incompleteness of written instruments 
has always been recognized as an exception to the 
parol evidence rule. In Fox Film Corp. vs. Ogden 
Theatre Company, Inc., 82 Utah 279, 17 P2d 294, the 
court discussed at some length the parol evidence rule 
and the exceptions thereto and stated, after reciting 
the rule, at Page 282: 
"There are numerous exceptions to this rule, 
however, most of which pertain to informal 
writings, incomplete memoranda, unilateral 
documents and other writings that do not 












The court then continued and stated, Page 283: 
"One well-recognized exception to the above 
rule is that extrinsic evidence, parol or other-
wise, is admissible to explain a latent am-
biguity in a writing. This does not mean that 
terms or conditions may be inserted into or 
taken out of the writing by direct oral asser-
tions, but it does mean that the court may 
receive evidence of such surrounding facts as 
will enable it to look upon the transaction 
through the eyes of the parties thereto and 
thereby know what they understood or in--
tended the ambiguous word or provision to 
mean. 4 Jones Commentary on Evidence 
# 1544, etc." 
As an example of what the court had in mind as 
far as latent ambiguity is concerned, the court in 
Fox Film Corp. vs. Ogden Theatre Company, Inc., 
supra, cited the early case of Boley vs. Butterfield, 57 
Utah 262, 194 P. 128. In this case there was a lease 
of summer grazing for sheep and in it no mention 
was made of whether or not the lessee was to have 
the exclusive use of the range for his sheep. As a 
matter of fact, the lessor had also leased to another 
sheep grazer. The first lessee refused to pay any 
rent on the grazing right. Trial court, noting the 
failure of the lease to state whether or not it was 
exclusive, permitted the lessor to state that he had 
advised the lessee prior to the lease that it was not 
an exclusive lease. 
The Boley vs. Butterfield principle applies exactly 
to the present situation. There is no mention in any 
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of the documents as to who is to program the Compu-
typer and place in its electronic control panel the 
various circuits that will make the machine produce 
the records that Flinco needed. This omitted item 
' on which the written contracts are incomplete, had 
to be supplied to the court by parol evidence. The 
parol evidence is without conflict. All of the evidence 
demonstrated that this was a responsibility of plaintiff 
and it actually paid third party defendant to do the 
work of programming. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court's finding 
that there was no written integrated agreement is 
supported by evidence. The written part was in-
complete and contained a latent ambiguity. Under 
such circumstances the court may ascertain what the 
agreement between the parties was and then deter-
mine their rights. 
POINT II 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS NOT 
PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF. 
The court found that part of the agreement be-
tween the parties was that the Computyper would be 
programmed, maintained and serviced for one year 
at the expense of the plaintiff. (See Findings of Fact, 
No. 3 Page 57). Court further found that the plaintiff 
attempted to program the defendant's business. The 
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programming was to be conducted in stages, and only 
a part of defendant's business was ever programmed 
into the Computyper. (See Findings of Fact, No. 4, 
Page 5 7). Court further found that the plaintiff and 
third party defendants, who were plaintiff's agents, 
never were able to program fully the business of 
defendant into the Computyper machine so that it 
would supply the business records needed by the 
defendant. (Findings of Fact, No. 5, Page 5 7). 
The three foregoing findings of the court were 
supported by evidence supplied by the plaintiff and 
the defendant. (See Statement of Facts for specific 
reference to testimony) . 
Defendant's evidence, m the form of testimony 
from Mr. Mastelotto, Mrs. Anderson and Miss Khant, 
was uncontradicted. Plaintiff made an attempt to 
program the business over the period of time that the 
Computyper was present. Finally, in an attempt 
to obtain the records needed by defendant, the TCPC 
was ordered. It was thought that with this machine 
conYerting the taped information immediately to the 
IBM card, that the errors which were turning up in 
the material produced by the Computyper would 
be quickly apparent. After six months of this system, 
Flinco came to the conclusion that it could not make 
the Computyper work. After sixteen months, the 
programming had never been completed. All that 
the Computyper was ever programmed for was the 
accounts receivable and the invoicing of sales at 
15 
Flinco's place of business. It still had not produced 
the cash and credit sales as separate, total items 
' and neither the inventory nor the payroll had been 
placed on the Computyper ( R. 266). 
It is the defendant's position that no evidence was 
ever supplied by plaintiff or by third party defendant 
which could be the basis of a finding that the pro-
gramming of defendant's business into the Compu-
typer was completed. This was a material matter. 
The very essence of the lease agrrement. The 
breach was the basis on which the termination of the 
lease was claimed by Flinco in its letter of December 
2, 1966. 
Defendant submits the termination was justified. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT PAID IN FULL ALL RENT 
DUE PRIOR TO CANCELLATION OF THE 
LEASE. 
Defendant paid the rent on the machines supplied 
by the Security Leasing up through the date of 
notice of termination December 2, 1966. Defendant 
tried in every way to get satisfactory performance 
from the Computyper. (See Statement of Facts for 
record references). It ordered an additional piece of 
equipment which would assist in translating the 
Computyper information into the IBM card. It suf-
fered for sixteen months with incomplete and in-
accurate records. 
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Plaintiff claims that the failure to cancel earlier 
than December 2, 1966 is laches on the defendant's 
part. It is defendant's position that during this period 
of time it was attempting to make such adjustments 
and accommodations as would give the Computyper, 
the plaintiff, and Mr. John B. Johnson of Office 
Equipment Associates, a reasonable chance to per-
form under the lease agreement. In Hanson Silo 
Company vs. Bennett, 254 Iowa 928, 119 NW 2d 764, 
the court quoted 12 Am fur, Contracts, #447, P. 1029 
as the rule: CP.767) 
"The general rule is that the right to rescind 
must be exercised within a reasonable time, 
although there is authority to the effect that 
the mere question of how much time a party 
to a contract has permitted to lapse is not 
necessarily determinative of the right to 
rescind, the important consideration being 
whether the period has been long enough to 
result in prejudice to the other party." 
It is undisputed that the machine could produce 
the records if it were properly programmed and 
operating in the manner that it was designed to 
operate CR. 166). 
Plaintiff could not be damaged by the defendant's 
extended efforts to get the machine to operate 
properly. It received its rent for the full period. It 
did not stay its hand in reliance on defendant's con-
duct. Its agent Johnson knew at all times that the 
programming was not complete. Corpus Juris Secun-
17 
dum, Vol. 17 A, Section 531 Contracts, Page 1026 
' states as the general rule in re laches: 
"As a general rule, where there are no con- , 
tractual limitations, a party to an agreement : 
may bring an action at any time until the ' 
action is barred by the statute of limitations 
and mere delay or laches, short of the statu'. 
tory period of limitations and not connected 
with such facts as may amount to an estoppel 
is not a bar to an action at law on the con'. 
tract. However, where one seeking to en-
force a contract has by his conduct and un-
reasonable delay brought about an undue 
hardship which by his diligence could have , 
been avoided, relief will be denied." 
The evidence supplied by defendant from the ! 
witnesses James P. Rice and George S. Burnett, who 
are local employees of the Friden Company, con-
vinced the court that John B. Johnson, the agent of , 
plaintiff who was charged with the duty of program-
ming the Computyper, did not have the necessary 
training and experience to wire into the electronic 
control panels the program which Flinco needed. 
As explained by these expert witnesses, the pro-
gramming of a business into the Computyper requires 
the removal from the Computyper of the program 
it originally had operated on ( R. 162) . A secondhand 
machine, such as the equipment supplied by Security 
Leasing, has already been programmed (R. 161). 
The problem of removal of the old program, that is 
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disconnecting the electronic panel circuits and insert-
ing a new program, is more complicated than the 
inserting of a program into a new machine that has 
not already been wired with a program (R. 171). 
Mr. Johnson had been an employee of Friden prior 
to setting up his own business in the name of Office 
Equipment Associates and had worked as a sales 
representative with the Friden Company. However, 
he had never been trained or designated as a pro-
grammer of the Friden equipment (R. 153). His job 
while at Friden, even when his testimony is taken 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was that of 
a sales representative who on occasion had assisted 
in the programming of machines (R. 171-172). A 
programmer is someone who has the highest degree 
of technical skill, ability and training in the handling 
of the Friden Computyper. It was undisputed by any 
testimony that there is not in the state of Utah or 
in the area serviced by the local Friden office, a per-
son trained to program the Computyper that was sup-
plied to Flinco. The closest trained, designated pro-
grammer for this kind of equipment is at Denver 
m. 159). 
Security Leasing obligated itself to program the 
Computyper rented to Flinco. This is standard prac-
tice in the rental or sale of the equipment (R. 172). 
The only person who attempted to accomplish the 
programming is John B. Johnson, plaintiff's agent. 
Plaintiff furnished no evidence whatsoever that it 
19 
ever attempted to get from the Friden Company 0 
designated, qualified programmer to insert into the 
Computyper the program necessary to produce for 
Flinco its business information. 
The court finding that the programming was 
never fully accomplished is undisputed. That the·. 
Computyper was never able to supply the business 
records which defendant needed is also supported by 
all the evidence. 
It is respectfully submitted that findings of the i 
court as set forth in this point were supported not I 
I 
only by a preponderance of the evidence, but by 
undisputed and uncontradicted evidence and were 
the only findings which would reasonably have been . 
made under the state of the evidence as shown by • 
this record. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of 
the trial court should be affirmed, that the defendant 1 
should have its costs incurred. 
Respectfully submitted this __________________________ day of 
----- ------ --- ------- -- -- -- -- ------ -- -- -----, 1969. 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Defendant Flinco, Inc. 
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